https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16532765872156354030&q=128+Nev.+651&hl=en&as_sdt=6,29
289 P.3d 212
(2012)
Supreme Court of
December 6, 2012.
213*213 Kolesar & Leatham
and Matthew J. Forstadt, Alan J. Lefebvre, and William
D. Schuller, Las Vegas, for Appellants.
Marquis Aurbach Coffing and Terry A. Coffing and
Micah S. Echols,
Before the Court En Banc.
By the Court, DOUGLAS, J.:
In this appeal we address, for the first time, the level of discretion that
a county has to determine how much to fund a regional health district under NRS
439.365, which sets forth the budgeting and funding process for health
districts in counties with populations over 700,000. Under this statute, we
address whether counties have the discretion to fund a health district in an
amount less than that requested by the health district, or whether the county
must simply approve the budget submitted by the health district up to the
statutory maximum set forth in NRS 439.365(2). Because we conclude that NRS
439.365 is ambiguous, we look to the statute's legislative history to resolve
this issue, and as the legislative history overwhelmingly demonstrates that NRS
439.365 was designed to provide health districts with a dedicated funding
source that would not be subject to the unabated discretion of the county, we
conclude that, under this statute, a county must fund the health district at
the amount requested, so long as that amount does not exceed NRS 439.365(2)'s
statutory cap.
In June 2011, respondent Southern Nevada Health District (SNHD) filed in
district court a petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition regarding its
budget dispute with appellants Clark County, Nevada; the Board of Commissioners
of Clark County, Nevada; County Commissioners Susan Brager,
Steve Sisolak, Tom Collins, Larry Brown, Lawrence
Weekly, Chris Giunchigliani, and Mary Beth Scow; and
Don Burnette, Clark County, Nevada, Manager
(hereinafter Clark County). SNHD's writ petition alleged
that, in 2005, the Nevada Legislature enacted legislation, specifically NRS
439.365, that mandated direct funding of SNHD out of
The district court held a hearing on SNHD's writ
petition during which, after considering the parties' arguments, it concluded
that it would rule in SNHD's favor on the petition.
Thereafter, the district court entered a written order granting the writs of
mandamus and prohibition sought by SNHD. More specifically, the district court
concluded that the controlling statute, NRS 439.365, was ambiguous as to
whether
We begin our analysis of the issues presented in this appeal by examining
NRS 439.365 under this court's rules of statutory construction and evaluating
the parties' competing interpretations of that statute. Concluding that SNHD
correctly argues that this statute requires counties to fund health districts
at the amount requested, up to the statutory cap set forth in NRS 439.365(2),
we then turn to whether, by seeking writs of mandamus and prohibition, SNHD
utilized the appropriate vehicles to compel Clark County to comply with the
requirements of NRS 439.365.
As part of a series of legislation enacted in 2005, health districts are
mandated for counties — such as
215*215 The funding process for a health district's annual budget is
set forth by statute in NRS 439.365, which provides in its entirety:
1. The district board of health shall prepare an annual
operating budget for the health district. The district board of health shall
submit the budget to the board of county commissioners before April 1 for
funding for the following fiscal year. The budget must be adopted by the board
of county commissioners as part of the annual county budget.
2. The board of county commissioners shall annually allocate
for the support of the health district an amount that does not exceed an amount
calculated by multiplying the assessed valuation of all taxable property in the
county by the rate of 3.5 cents on each $100 of assessed valuation. The amount
allocated pursuant to this subsection must be transferred from the county
general fund to the health district fund created by the board of county
commissioners pursuant to NRS 439.363.
At issue in this appeal is whether NRS 439.365 provides counties with the
authority to modify a health district's budget from the figure requested by the
health district pursuant to NRS 439.365(1) and to allocate this modified
amount, rather than the amount requested, for the support of the health
district.
This court begins its statutory analysis with the plain meaning rule. We the People Nevada v. Secretary of State, 124 Nev. 874,
881, 192 P.3d 1166, 1170-71 (2008). If the
Legislature's intention is apparent from the face of the statute, there is no
room for construction, and this court will give the statute its plain meaning. Madera v. SIIS, 114 Nev. 253, 257, 956 P.2d 117, 120 (1998). Statutes should be read as a whole, so as not to render
superfluous words or phrases or make provisions nugatory. Southern Nev. Homebuilders v. Clark County, 121 Nev. 446,
449, 117 P.3d 171, 173 (2005). If the
statute is ambiguous, meaning that it is capable of two or more reasonable
interpretations, In
re Candelaria, 126 Nev. ___, ___, 245 P.3d 518,
520 (2010), this court will "look to the provision's legislative
history and the ... scheme as a whole to determine what the ... framers
intended," We
the People, 124 Nev. at 881, 192 P.3d at 1171, and we will examine
"`the context and the spirit of the law or the causes which induced the
legislature to enact it.'" Leven
v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 405, 168 P.3d 712, 716 (2007) (quoting McKay
v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 650-51, 730 P.2d 438, 443 (1986));
accord State,
Bus. & Indus, v. Granite Constr., 118 Nev. 83, 87, 40 P.3d 423, 426 (2002).
The district court concluded, without explanation, that the statute was
ambiguous and, based on the legislative history of NRS 439.365, the statute
required
SNHD focuses its plain language argument on the final sentence of NRS
439.365(1) and the first sentence of NRS 439.365(2). With regard to the last
sentence of NRS 439.365(1), which provides that "[t]he budget [submitted
by the health district] must be adopted by the board of county commissioners as
part of the annual county budget," SNHD points to the use of the term
"must" in this sentence and argues that this mandatory language
"removes Clark County's discretion to approve or disapprove SNHD's budget." To further support this argument, SNHD
emphasizes the phrase "shall annually allocate for the support of the
health district," in the first sentence of subsection 2 of this statute,
contending that this language makes the allocation of funds to SNHD mandatory.
Based on the language in these two sentences, SNHD maintains that NRS 439.365
requires Clark County to approve its budget without making any modifications to
the amount requested, so long as the budget does not exceed the maximum amount
dictated by NRS 439.365(2).
The inherent weakness in both of the parties' arguments is that they focus
exclusively on the specific words and phrases in NRS 439.365 that they contend
support their interpretations of the statute. It is well settled that, in
interpreting a statute, this court must examine the statute as a whole. See Southern
Nev. Homebuilders, 121 Nev. at 449, 117 P.3d at 173.
But when NRS 439.365 is read in its entirety, the parties' respective arguments
highlight a discrepancy in the statute between the final sentence of subsection
1, where the mandatory language implies that a county has no control over a
health district's budget, and the first sentence of subsection 2, which appears
to provide the county with the authority to fix the health district's budget,
up to the statutory maximum. Thus, when the statute is read as a whole, both
the interpretation offered by Clark County — that NRS 439.365 gives it
discretionary authority over SNHD's budget — and that
offered by SNHD — that the county has no such authority and must approve the
budget as submitted, so long as it does not exceed the statutory maximum — can
be deemed reasonable. As a result, like the district court, we conclude that
NRS 439.365 is ambiguous, see In
re Candelaria. 126 Nev. at ___, 245 P.3d at 520
(providing that statutory language is ambiguous when it is capable of more than
one reasonable interpretation), and thus, we turn to the legislative history to
determine the statute's proper construction.[4] Leven,
123 Nev. at 404, 168 P.3d at 716.
In the underlying proceeding, once the district court determined that NRS
439.365 was ambiguous, it looked to the statute's legislative history and
concluded that the legislative history demonstrated that "the Legislature
intended to provide SNHD with a direct source of funding," and thus, the
district court adopted SNHD's interpretation of this
statute.[5] Indeed, NRS
439.365's legislative history overwhelmingly demonstrates that the purpose
behind the statute was to provide health districts with a direct funding source
and to limit county authority over their budgets.
During the Legislature's consideration of Assembly Bill 380, the bill that
ultimately resulted in, among other statutes, NRS 439.365, one proponent of the
bill, Dan Musgrove, the Director of Intergovernmental Relations for the Office
of the
Our amendment does two things, and this was on our
discussions with [Assemblyman] Parks as to what he envisioned and what we
thought would be the best thing for [SNHD] going forward, in terms of an
established funding source. The first thing is to go ahead and allow for
them to have a tax levy not to exceed $3.25 per $100 of taxable property.
Now, that is simply shifting of an existing countywide rate
so that there isn't any increase at all, in terms of the countywide rate. It's
simply a redistribution of existing funds that would go directly to [SNHD]....
Hearing on A.B. 380 Before the Assembly Comm. on
Health and Human Services, 73d Leg. (
As I understand it, the advantage to this is for [SNHD], and
it provides them a dedicated funding stream. Before this proposed bill, they
have to come in and ask the county commission every year, and depending on how
the commissioners feel about the department, their budget might go up or down.
218*218
After adopting its interpretation of NRS 439.365, the district court
concluded that extraordinary relief was warranted, and as such, it granted SNHD's petition for a writ of mandamus and a writ of
prohibition. The district court's issuance of a writ of prohibition is
problematic, however; accordingly, we now turn to the propriety of the district
court's grant of SNHD's requests for writ relief.
A writ of mandamus is available "to compel the performance of an act
which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station," NRS 34.160, or "to control an arbitrary or capricious
exercise of discretion." Berrum
v. Otto, 127 Nev. ___, ___, 255 P.3d 1269, 1272 (2011) (internal quotations omitted). A writ of prohibition may
issue to arrest the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person
exercising judicial functions, when such proceedings are in excess of the
jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person. NRS 34.320. Both mandamus and prohibition are available only
when the petitioner has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law. NRS 34.170 (mandamus); 34.330 (prohibition). This court
reviews a district court's grant or denial of a writ petition under an abuse of
discretion standard. DR Partners v. Bd. of County Comm'rs,
116 Nev. 616, 621, 6 P.3d 465, 468 (2000).
Related statutory and legal issues, however, are reviewed de novo. Berrum, 127 Nev. at ___, 255
P.3d at 1272.
In the underlying case, the district court granted SNHD's
request for mandamus relief to direct Clark County "to fully fund SNHD for
fiscal year 2012" at the amount requested by SNHD. The district court
further granted SNHD a writ of prohibition to restrain
Because NRS Chapter 439 does not provide any statutory remedy for a health
district to compel a county to comply with the funding requirements of NRS
439.365 and given that SNHD is seeking funds that, under our interpretation of
that statute, Clark County improperly withheld, we conclude that a writ of
mandamus represents the proper vehicle for compelling Clark County to comply
with its duty to fully fund SNHD in compliance with NRS 439.365. Berrum, 127 Nev. ___, 255 P.3d 1269
(affirming a district court's grant of mandamus relief to taxpayers seeking
refunds from a county treasurer when there was no other adequate statutory or
legal remedy and the treasurer had a duty to refund the amounts requested).
Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of mandamus relief.
219*219 With regard to the writ of prohibition granted by the district
court, however, such relief is available only to arrest the proceedings of an
individual or entity exercising judicial functions when such proceedings are in
excess of the individual or entity's jurisdiction. NRS
34.320. Here,
NRS 439.365 is ambiguous. Based on the statute's legislative history, it
must be interpreted as requiring a county to adopt a health district's budget
as submitted and without modification, so long as the requested amount does not
exceed the statutory maximum set forth in NRS 439.365(2). With regard to the
remedy utilized by the district court, we find no abuse of discretion in its
grant of a writ of mandamus, but conclude that prohibition relief was
improperly granted, as
We concur: CHERRY, C.J., and SAITTA, GIBBONS, HARDESTY, and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.
PICKERING, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. It commands — mandates — that an act be
performed, exactly as ordered, no questions asked. Mandamus will not issue
unless the act to be compelled is "ministerial," Collier
v. Legakes, 98 Nev. 307, 310, 646 P.2d 1219, 1221
(1982), that is to say, a matter of duty, NRS 34.160, not discretion. Round Hill Gen. Imp. Dist. v.
Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603, 637 P.2d 534, 536
(1981).
In upholding mandamus in this case, the majority decides that
More troubling, resolving this dispute by means of mandamus says that
neither Clark County nor anyone else has any discretion when it comes to SNHD's operating budget 220*220 once SNHD sets it.[2] Per the
majority,
Statutory construction does not proceed in a vacuum. Clark County is a local
government and as such is fully subject to the Local Government Budget and
Finance Act, NRS 354.470-354.626, whose purposes are, among others, "[t]o
provide for the control of revenues, expenditures and expenses in order to
promote prudence and efficiency in the expenditure of public money" and
"[t]o provide specific methods enabling the public, taxpayers and
investors to be apprised of the financial preparations, plans, policies and
administration of all local governments." NRS 354.472(1)(d),
(e). The Act defines "budget" as "a plan of financial
operation embodying an estimate of proposed expenditures and expenses
for a given period and the proposed means of financing them." NRS
354.492 (emphasis added). Under NRS 354.596, Clark County's "budget"
is "tentative" and must be submitted "[o]n or before April
15" of each year to the Department of Taxation, NRS 354.596(2), while
"notice of the time and place of a public hearing on the tentative
budget" must be provided, NRS 354.596(3), "at which time interested
persons must be given an opportunity to be heard." NRS
354.598(1). Only after the public hearing is held (on the third Monday
in May, NRS 354.596(4)(a)), and then only upon "the favorable votes of a
majority of all members of the governing body," NRS 354.598(2), does Clark
County's "budget" move from a tentative budget presenting
"proposed expenditures" to final.
NRS 439.365 is a budgeting and funding statute and, as such, should be read
in the context of the Local Government Budget and Finance Act, NRS
354.470-354.626. Thus, NRS 439.365(1) provides that SNHD "shall prepare an
annual operating budget," that it "shall submit the budget to the
board of county commissioners before April 1 for funding for the following
fiscal year," and that "[t]he budget must be adopted by the board of
county commissioners as part of the annual county budget." What I take
this to mean is that SNHD is tasked with preparing a "budget" — that
is, "an estimate of proposed expenditures and expenses" for the
coming year, NRS 354.492 — that it must submit to Clark County by April 1. NRS 439.365(1). Two weeks later, on April 15, Clark County
must in turn file its budget, presumably incorporating SNHD's
submission, and schedule and give notice of the public hearing required to be
held in late May. NRS 354.596. But neither the budget
SNHD submits to Clark County nor the budget Clark County files and submits to
public hearing becomes final until publicly aired and voted on by "all
members of the governing body," NRS 354.598(2), that is, the Clark County
Commission.
221*221 For the Local Government Budget and Finance Act public hearing
process to be meaningful, submission of a true operating budget, one calculated
with reference to need, not entitlement, is essential.
I thus reject SNHD's reading of NRS 439.365 as
imposing a mandatory funding obligation in an amount automatically equal to the
number arrived at "by multiplying the assessed valuation of all taxable
property in the county by the rate of 3.5 cents on each $100 of assessed
valuation." NRS 439.365(2). SNHD's
interpretation not only reads the words "an amount that does not
exceed" out of NRS 439.365(2), it fails to harmonize NRS 439.365 with the
provisions of the Local Government Budget and Finance Act.
Ordinarily, budgeting is discretionary and inherently legislative, making it
inappropriate for mandamus relief. Cf. Young
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 91 Nev. 52, 56, 530
P.2d 1203, 1206 (1975) (dictum); see also Co.
of Washoe v. City of Reno, 77 Nev. 152, 155-57, 360 P.2d 602, 603-04 (1961)
(reversing district court issuance of writ of mandamus where the city could sue
the county for damages for breach of statutory obligation to fund road work).
However, an official's failure to exercise discretion when its exercise is
required can violate a duty, permitting mandamus relief to compel the official
to undertake the discretionary review process, though not to dictate its
outcome. Collier,
98 Nev. at 310, 646 P.2d at 1221. And this court
has recognized that budgetary requests, when stipulated as reasonable, can
become a duty. Young,
91 Nev. at 56, 530 P.2d at 1206. The record in
this case is extremely limited, and what there is suggests that both SNHD, see
supra note 2, and
I agree with the majority that prohibition is inappropriate in this case. However, I do not agree with the majority's reading of NRS 439.365 or its issuance of mandamus on this record and therefore respectfully dissent.
_________________________
[1] A separate set of statutes apply to the
creation of health districts in counties with populations less than 700,000. See
NRS 439.369-.410. Health districts are optional in these smaller counties. See
NRS 439.370.
[2] Health districts may also receive and
disburse federal money and submit applications to and enter into agreements
with federal agencies. NRS 439.367(1). Additional
funding can come from private, state, or local sources. NRS
439.367(2).
[3] With regard to Clark County's argument
that use of the term "operating budget" in NRS 439.365(1)
demonstrates that it has the authority to reject capital requests in SNHD's budget, because "operating budget" is not
defined by that statute, we conclude that this argument highlights an
additional ambiguity in NRS 439.365. We need not define this phrase or
otherwise address this argument, however, because this argument is not properly
before the court. Notably, there is nothing in the record to support a
conclusion that SNHD's budget specifically
sought funding for alleged capital items nor is there anything
demonstrating that
[4] In asserting that the district court's
decision to grant extraordinary writ relief should be reversed and remanded,
our dissenting colleague focuses her interpretation of NRS 439.365 on the
application of the Local Government Budget and Finance Act, NRS 354.470-.626,
to the budgeting dispute issue raised in this appeal. This argument is not
properly before us, as neither party advanced this argument in the district
court or on appeal; thus, we do not consider it now. See Edwards
v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n. 38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.
38 (2006) (stating that, when a party fails to make arguments or provide
citations to relevant authority addressing an issue, this court need not
consider that issue in resolving the appeal).
The dissent further maintains that our interpretation of this statute
effectively reads the words "does not exceed" out of subsection 2 of
this statute, before going on to reject our conclusion that NRS 439.365 is
ambiguous. To reach this result, our dissenting colleague fails to account for
the mandatory language of NRS 439.365(1), which provides that the budget
submitted by the health district "must be adopted" by the county. It
is the discrepancy between this mandatory language and the language of
subsection 2, appearing to give the county discretion to fix the health
district's budget up to the statutory maximum, that creates the ambiguity that
we address here today by applying this court's well-established principles of
statutory construction that, when a statute is ambiguous, this court looks to
the statute's legislative history to determine the framers' intent and examines
the context and spirit of the law or the reasoning that induced the Legislature
to enact that statute. We the People Nevada v. Secretary of State, 124 Nev. 874,
881, 192 P.3d 1166, 1170-71 (2008); Leven
v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 405, 168 P.3d 712, 716 (2007).
[5] On appeal,
[6]
[7] Having considered the parties' remaining
arguments, we conclude that they either lack merit or need not be addressed in
light of the basis for our resolution of this matter. Additionally, we vacate
the stay of the district court's order imposed by our January 5, 2012, order.
[1] The majority also cites NRS 387.195, the
school funding statute, as support for its reading of NRS 439.365. Unlike NRS
439.365, NRS 387.195 is unqualified in its allocation and does not use NRS
439.365's "does not exceed" qualifying language. NRS 387.195 does not
support, rather, it undermines, the majority's reading of NRS 439.365.
[2] That SNHD determines its demand
formulaically, not by reference to its actual or projected operating expenses
or other available funds, is suggested by the limited record available. Thus,
SNHD initially contended that its operating budget and, hence, Clark County's
mandatory funding obligation, equaled $19,870,482; it came up with that number
mathematically, by applying the "3.5 cents on each $100 of assessed
valuation" provided for in NRS 439.365(2) to the assessed valuation of all
taxable property in Clark County. It recalculated that number upward by
$1,690,000 after the May 26, 2011, decision in Clean
Water Coalition v. The M Resort, 127 Nev. ___, 255 P.3d 247 (2011),
augmented
[3] From what appears in the limited record
available,