377 F.Supp.2d 141 (2005)
No. CIV.A. 04-1192RCL.
United States
District Court,
July 13, 2005.
142*142 143*143 144*144 Dave Harrison,
Stratton Christopher
LAMBERTH, District Judge.
Plaintiff, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, brought this action pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Plaintiff challenges the disposition of his FOIA request by the Executive Office for United States Attorneys ("EOUSA"). Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to Defendant's motion and a motion for summary judgment. Based on the undisputed facts, the applicable law, and the parties' submissions, the Court will grant the Defendant's motion.
On September 4, 2001, plaintiff sent a FOIA request to the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of California ("USAO/SDCA"). Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Deft's Mot."), Declaration of Mary Beth Uitti ("Uitti Decl."), Exhibit ("Ex.") A. Plaintiff requested the following information:
From January, 1985, until Larry A. Burns became a magistrate judge, I request a comprehensive list of every case, to include (1) case caption and number; (2) name of parties; (3) name of court; (4) name of the judge presiding over the case; and (5) name(s) and address(es) of defense counsel; prosecuted by Burns (A) for the federal government in his capacity as an Assistant U.S. Attorney, and (B) for the State of California in his capacity as Special Prosecutor (or under any designation).
Mr. Burns was an Assistant United States Attorney with the
USAO/SDCA from 1985 to 1997 and a
At the direction of the EOUSA, the USAO/SDCA searched for
records responsive to plaintiff's request.
Plaintiff appealed the EOUSA's decision to the Office of Information and Privacy ("OIP"). Plaintiff's Opposition to Deft's Mot. ("Pl's Opp."), Ex. C. On February 27, 2004, OIP affirmed EOUSA's decision. Uitti Decl., Ex. I.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Material facts are those that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C.Cir.1994).
In considering whether there is a triable issue of fact, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 865 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C.Cir.1989). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The non-moving party must do more than simply "show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Moreover, "any factual assertions in the movant's affidavits will be accepted as being true unless [the opposing party] submits his own affidavits or other documentary evidence contradicting the assertion." Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C.Cir.1992) (quoting Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir.1982)).
The mere existence of a factual dispute by itself, however, is not enough to bar summary judgment. The party opposing the motion must show that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To be material, the fact must be capable of affecting the outcome of the litigation; to be genuine, the issue must be supported by admissible evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party. See id.; Laningham v. United States Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (D.C.Cir.1987).
FOIA cases are typically and appropriately decided on motions
for summary judgment. Miscavige v. IRS, 2 F.3d 366, 368 (11th
Cir.1993); Rushford v. Civiletti, 485 F.Supp.
477, 481 n. 13 (D.D.C.1980). In a FOIA case, the
Court may award summary judgment solely on the basis of information provided by
the department or agency in affidavits or declarations 146*146 when the
affidavits or declarations describe "the documents and the justifications for
nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail, demonstrate that the information
withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption, and are not controverted
by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad faith."
Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656
F.2d 724,
738 (D.C.Cir.1981); see also Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28
(D.C.Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
977, 94 S.Ct. 1564, 39 L.Ed.2d 873 (1974). Agency
affidavits or declarations must be "relatively detailed and non-conclusory ..."
SafeCard Services v. SEC, 926 F.2d
1197, 1200 (D.C.Cir.1991). Such affidavits or
declarations are accorded "a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted
by `purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other
documents."
To obtain summary judgment on the issue of the adequacy of the
search for records under FOIA, an agency must show "viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to the requester, that... [it] `has conducted a search
reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.'" Steinberg v. United States Dep't of Justice,
23 F.3d 548, 552 (D.C.Cir.1994)
(quoting Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice,
745 F.2d
1476, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1984)). To meet its burden,
the agency may submit affidavits or declarations that explain in reasonable
detail and in a non-conclusory fashion the scope and method of the agency's
search. Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 126
(D.C.Cir.1982). In the absence of contrary
evidence, such affidavits or declarations are sufficient to demonstrate an
agency's compliance with FOIA.
The Court's inquiry regarding the adequacy of the search focuses on the search itself, not its results. Weisberg v. DOJ, 745 F.2d at 1485. An agency's failure to find a particular document does not undermine the determination that the search was adequate. Wilbur v. CIA, 355 F.3d 675, 678 (D.C.Cir.2004); Nation Magazine v. United States Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 892 n. 7 (D.C.Cir.1995).
In response to plaintiff's request, the USAO/SDCA searched for
all cases that had been handled by Larry Burns as an Assistant United States
Attorney and as a Special Assistant United States Attorney, a designation given
to state prosecutors who handle cases for the USAO/SDCA. Uitti Decl., ¶ 8.
Sheila Knight, an employee of the USAO/SDCA's case management system, searched
two databases, the Legal Information Office Network System ("LIONS") and the
Tracking Assistance Legal Office Network ("TALON").
The USAO/SDCA searched these databases using the terms "Larry
Burns" and "LAB."
It is apparent from the declaration submitted by the EOUSA that it has made a "good faith effort to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods which reasonably can be expected to produce the information requested." Moore v. Aspin, 916 F.Supp. 32, 35 (D.D.C.1996)(citing Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 68). As such, the search for Plaintiff's requested records was adequate to fulfill Defendant's obligations under the FOIA.
The EOUSA withheld certain information in the records provided
to Plaintiff under the authority of Exemption 7(C) of the FOIA. That exemption
protects from mandatory disclosure records compiled for law enforcement purposes
to the extent that disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 5 U.S.C. § 522b(7)(C). In determining
whether this exemption applies to particular material, the Court must balance
the interest in privacy of the individual mentioned in the record against the
public's interest in disclosure. Beck v. Dep't of Justice, 997 F.2d
1489, 1491 (D.C.Cir.1993); Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 91
(D.C.Cir.1984). It is the "interest of the
general public, and not that of the private litigant" that the court considers
in this analysis. Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75 (2d
Cir.1981) (citing Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 171-72
(D.C.Cir.1975)). "[T]he only public interest
relevant for purposes of Exemption 7(C) is one that focuses on `the citizens'
right to be informed about what their government is up to.'" Davis v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 968
F.2d
1276, 1282 (D.C.Cir.1992) (quoting Dep't of
Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
The EOUSA invokes Exemption 7(C) to protect the identities of
criminal defendants, targets of criminal investigations, and their attorneys.
Uitti Decl., ¶ 19. The EOUSA asserts that disclosure of this information would
violate the privacy rights of third-parties and could result in subjecting them
to harassment or unwanted exposure and embarrassment.
148*148 The names and identities of individuals of investigatory
interest to law enforcement agencies and those merely mentioned in law
enforcement files have been consistently protected from disclosure for the
reasons Defendant asserts here. See Perrone v. FBI, 908 F.Supp. 24, 26
(D.D.C.1995) (citing Dep't of Justice v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489
Plaintiff argues that the case captions, the names and addresses
of those prosecuted, and the identities of the attorneys are not exempt from
disclosure because such information could be obtained through a search of the
records of the state and federal courts. In cases involving personal data on
private citizens in law enforcement records, " the privacy interest... is at its
apex." Reporters Committee, 489
The Supreme Court has recognized that a strong policy interest
inheres in the non-disclosure of compiled computerized information. See
Reporters Committee, 489
Defendant has proffered a legitimate individual privacy interest in non-disclosure. Conversely, Plaintiff has not identified a public benefit to disclosure. The Court concludes that the EOUSA properly invoked Exemption 7(C).
If a record contains information that is exempt from disclosure,
any reasonably segregable information must be released after deleting the exempt
portions, unless the non-exempt portions are inextricably intertwined with
exempt portions. See Trans-Pacific Policing Agreement v. United States
Customs Serv., 177 F.3d
1022, 1026-27 (D.C.Cir.1999); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
In its declaration, the EOUSA states that each document was
reviewed on a line-by-line basis. Uitti Decl., ¶ 23. The EOUSA only redacted the
names and identifying information concerning private third parties.
Having reviewed the declaration the Court concludes that the EOUSA withheld only the portions of records exempt under FOIA's provisions, and that all reasonably segregable material has been released. With respect to these records, the agency declarations and attachments adequately specify "in detail which portions of the document[s] are disclosable and which are allegedly exempt." Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 827.
Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant summary judgment favor of defendant. An appropriate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion issued this 13th day of July, 2005, it is ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment [Dkt.# 15] is GRANTED.
FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [Dkt.# 20] is DENIED.
Judgment is entered in favor of defendant.
This is a final appealable order. See Fed. R.App. P 4(a).
SO ORDERED.