Civil Action No. 14-6689.
105 F.Supp.3d 484 (2015)
Jeffrey J. DEPOLO v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF TREDYFFRIN TOWNSHIP et al.
United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.
Signed May 18, 2015.
Robert B. Famiglio, Media, PA, pro se.
Maureen M. McBride, Law Offices of Windle & McErlane, P.C., John E.D. Larkin, Stacey L. Fuller, Gawthrop Greenwood PC, West Chester, PA, for Board of Supervisors of Tredyffrin Township et al.
DALZELL, District Judge.
Ham radio aficionado Jeffrey J. DePolo sued the Tredyffrin Township Board of Supervisors and its members (collectively, the "Board") and the Township's Zoning Hearing Board of Appeals and its members
[105 F.Supp.3d 486]
Because we grant the defendants' motions dismissing this action, we will deny as moot the motion for reconsideration which certain of DePolo's neighbors filed after we denied them leave to intervene in this action.
A defendant moving to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) bears the burden
of proving that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see also Hedges v. United States,
Our Court of Appeals obliges district courts considering a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to engage in a two-part analysis:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The district court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a district court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court generally looks
to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments, without reference to
any other part of the record. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien &
Frankel,
[105 F.Supp.3d 487]
We draw our recital of the factual background from the plaintiff's complaint and the factual findings in the Zoning Board's decision denying DePolo's application for what effectively would be a 190-foot tower, but granting him a permit for a 65-foot tower. DePolo appended the Zoning Board decision as an Exhibit to the complaint.
On November 25, 2013, the plaintiff prepared and filed a request for a building permit for a "180-foot self-supporting antenna system" in order to pursue his amateur radio operations from his residence on Horseshoe Trail, Malvern, Pennsylvania.2 Cmplt. at ¶¶ 14, 24. Because of the many tall trees on his property and the hilly terrain, that height was the "minimum height necessary" to permit communication on the radio frequencies of interest to him. Id. at ¶¶ 28, 29. On February 4, 2014, after the Zoning Officer denied his permit, he appealed to the ZHBA requesting a permit for an antenna installation in excess of the 35-foot ordinance limit. Id. at ¶ 25; see also Ex. A at 26. The local zoning ordinance at issue, Section 208-18.G of the Tredyffrin Township Zoning Ordinance, establishes area, bulk and height restrictions for the R½ residential district in which DePolo lives and provides that "[t]he height of any building shall not exceed 35 feet." Ex. A at 11. Section 208-113, Building height projections, provides in relevant part that "antennas and similar projections shall be included in calculating the height of a building," with certain conditions. Id.
The ZHBA held public hearings on March 27, April 30, May 5, May 22, and June 26, 2014 to take evidence and consider DePolo's application. Cmplt. at ¶ 26. The ZHBA reviewed the Zoning Officer's denial of DePolo's permit application and the Officer's offer to allow DePoloto to build a 65-foot tower in recognition of a Pennsylvania law fostering amateur radio operation. Ex. A at 19. DePolo contended at the hearing that the Zoning Officer erred in denying the permit for a 180-foot tower. Id. He argued that the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") rule known as PRB-1, Federal Preemption of State and Local Regulations Pertaining to Amateur Radio Facilities, 101 F.C.C.2d 952 (1985), adopted at 47 C.F.R. § 97.15(b), (hereinafter "PRB-1") preempts the Township from restricting antenna height. Id. He declined to reduce the height of the proposed tower he sought to build. Id. at 15.
The ZHBA granted party status to DePolo's Horseshoe Trail neighbors, Schuylkill Township, the National Park Service of the United States Department of the Interior — representing Valley Forge National Historical Park ("Valley Forge") — and an association of 800 homeowners. Id. at 2. The ZHBA admitted into evidence sixteen exhibits on its own behalf, fifty-eight exhibits on DePolo's behalf, twenty-four exhibits on behalf of the Horseshoe Trail neighbors, one on behalf of Schuylkill Township, and two on behalf of Tredyffrin Township. Id. at 2-9.
The ZHBA found that the plaintiff's property at 1240 Horseshoe Trail is a 2.9 acre wooded lot located in the Township's R-1/2 residential district. Id. at 10. There is also a 200-foot PECO tower and noncommercial 90-foot tower along Horseshoe Trail in Schuylkill Township. Id. In the summer of 2000, DePolo purchased a home at 1465 Horseshoe Trail, Schuylkill Township, Chester County, and applied for
[105 F.Supp.3d 488]
The ZHBA found that the tower DePolo seeks to build on his personal property was 15 feet wide at its base and about a yard across between the 120-foot and 180-foot marks and was to be installed about thirty-five to forty feet from the southeast corner of the DePolo home. Id. at 11, 12. The proposed tower had no guy wires as it was to be self-supporting and no beacon as it was below the Federal Aviation Administration's 200-foot threshold. Id. at 12. DePolo, who has held an amateur radio license since 1988, intended to use the tower for non-commercial purposes. Id. Clear line of sight works best for all frequencies. Id.
The ZHBA also made factual findings that DePolo could currently communicate at VHF, UHF and microwave frequencies with two seventeen-foot antennas (one of which was mounted to the top of a ten-foot basketball stand). Id. at 13. A 65-foot tower with a seven megahertz antenna would enable him to reach Ireland, Portugal, most of Spain, parts of North Africa and parts of France with a 40% reliability threshold (a term not defined in the ZHBA decision), a threshold that would only increase to 50% were the 180-foot tower permitted. Id. It also found that a 65-foot tower with a fourteen megahertz antenna would allow DePolo to reach Belgium, Amsterdam, all of Spain and North Africa with a 40-50% reliability threshold, which would only increase by ten percentage points were he permitted to build the 180-foot tower. Id. at 13, 14. The ZHBA also found that amateur radio operators can communicate over the Internet or by using amateur satellite antennas. Id. at 14.
The ZHBA found that the proposed 180-foot tower was "not compatible" with the surrounding residential neighborhood and "would create an adverse visual impact on the neighborhood." Id. at 15. It also found that the tower's "height, mass, and latticework design" was "of a type universally associated with ... a factory area or industrialized complex" and posed a safety hazard to neighboring properties because its fall radius extended well into those properties. Id. Valley Forge objected to the application because the proposed tower "would be visible from a key viewpoint in Valley Forge National Historical Park." Id. "Long views within and beyond the Valley Forge National Historical Park are [a] historic resource and an important aspect of the visitor experience." Id. at 16.
The ZHBA reviewed state and federal regulations touching on the zoning appeal. Id. At the state level, Section 302 of the General Local Government Code provides that municipalities regulating antenna height "shall impose only the minimum regulations necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose of the municipality," id. (quoting 53 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 302(a)). Municipalities may impose necessary safety regulations but must accommodate amateur radio communications, inter alia, by not restricting radio antenna height to less than sixty-five feet above ground level. Id. Municipalities may also take action to "protect or preserve a historic, a historical or an architectural district that is established by the municipality or pursuant to Federal or State law." Id. (quoting 53 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 302(c)).
And, at the federal level, the ZHBA considered PRB-1's "policy of limited preemption
[105 F.Supp.3d 489]
"This Board looks to these regulations and the interpretations thereof, as expressed by the FCC in the First Modification and Second Modification, for guidance in the application of the limited preemption of local regulation of amateur radio communications," the ZHBA stated. Id.
The ZHBA found that the R-½ residential district in which DePolo lives is designed under Zoning Ordinance § 208-16 "to minimize disruption to notable features such as the Exceptional Value Valley Creek Watershed ... Valley Forge Mountain, and the natural, scenic and historic character of the Township." Id. at 19. It also found that the reasonable accommodation required under the Second Modification did not "require[] a municipality to allow an amateur operator to erect any antenna [he] desires," id. at 20 (reviewing cases), such as a 180-foot tower "on a property not wide enough to ensure that, if the proposed tower were to fall, it would not impact any neighboring properties." Id. at 22.
The ZHBA concluded that the Township had made a reasonable accommodation contemplated by the FCC by allowing a 65-foot tower — which DePolo declined despite "ample evidence" it would permit him to engage in extensive radio communications. Id. at 23. The ZHBA also concluded that the Tredyffrin Township Zoning Ordinance limiting the maximum height of structures in the R-1/2 residential district to thirty-five feet was not invalid because DePolo had the opportunity to seek a variance that he withdrew by stipulation. Id. at 23-24.
On October 23, 2014 the ZHBA issued its decision denying DePolo's application for the 180-foot tower but granting him a
[105 F.Supp.3d 490]
On November 21, 2014, DePolo sued the Tredyffrin Board of Supervisors and its individual members as well as the ZHBA and its members. DePolo alleges that at no time before, during, or after the hearings did the ZHBA or the Board attempt to negotiate with him. Cmplt. at ¶ 27. He also alleges that a zoning officer not empowered to issue a permit suggested he would be allowed a 65-foot structure but "which, for reasons demonstrated at the hearing ... would provide for a completely ineffective antenna height and would not allow the operation applicant required." Id. He contends, as he did at the hearings, that the height he requested is "the minimum height necessary to permit [him] to achieve his communications goals in the very high frequency [VHF], ultra high frequency [UHF], and super high frequency [SHF] as well as other amateur radio bands, with the privileges granted to [him] by the FCC under his existing license." Id. at ¶ 28. He contends he needs the requested height because of the area's tall trees and rolling terrain. Id. at ¶ 29.
DePolo seeks a declaratory judgment that the Federal Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and the FCC regulation promulgated at 47 C.F.R. § 97.15(b)5 preempt the Tredyffrin Township zoning ordinances. He also seeks a judgment declaring that the ZHBA decision violates the FCC provision and that the Township's zoning ordinance, facially and as applied, violates Pennsylvania state law governing municipal regulations of antenna height. He seeks a court order permitting his 180-foot tower as well as relief under Pennsylvania state statutes. Cmplt. at 10-13.
On December 31, 2014, the ZHBA filed a motion to dismiss and the Board did likewise on January 23, 2015. On January 8, 2015, a group of DePolo's neighbors resident in Schuylkill Township moved to intervene, as did Schuylkill Township the day after. We granted both motions on January 22, 2015. On March 18, 2015, we denied a different group of DePolo's neighbors resident in Tredyffrin Township permission to intervene. They filed a motion for reconsideration on March 31, 2015 which the ZHBA, its members and Schuylkill Township support, and which DePolo opposes.
The ZHBA moves to dismiss on several grounds.
It argues that Pennsylvania's statutory scheme for processing challenges to zoning ordinances provides that the ZHBA, an administrative-adjudicatory agency, is empowered to hear appeals from Zoning Officer decisions, and a landowner dissatisfied with the Board's decision has a right to appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. Mem. of Law at 8, 9. It contends we should therefore exercise our discretion not to hear this declaratory judgment action in light of the state and local issues raised and the Pennsylvania General Assembly's comprehensive statutory scheme for zoning appeals. Id. at 10. It also argues that we should abstain from hearing a case that would impede the "rightful independence of the state governments." Id. (quoting
[105 F.Supp.3d 491]
Lastly, the ZHBA contends that DePolo has failed to assert a federal
preemption claim because the governing federal law on which he rests his claim,
the FCC's PRB-1 rulemaking, does not preempt the Township ordinance.6 Id. at 17. It urges that we rely on Williams v.
City of Columbia,
DePolo responds in opposition that the Tredyffrin Township residential height ordinance is preempted by PRB-1. Resp. to ZHBA MTD at 14. DePolo insists that the Township's height limitation for residential structures does not provide the reasonable accommodation required. Id. at 20. And he contends that the FCC's First Modification rejected balancing tests to limit antenna height that weigh the amateur radio operator's interests against the municipality's needs. Id. at 21. DePolo also contends that we may hear his state law claims because they arise from a common nucleus of operative facts. Id. at 25. He maintains that Pennsylvania enacted Section 302 to give amateur radio enthusiasts "all the protections of the federal regulation," id. (emphasis omitted), while imposing a 65-foot antenna height minimum on municipalities. Id. "Since the Federal preemption claim is valid on its face," he claims, we may assert jurisdiction over his ancillary claims as well.7 Id. at 29. DePolo also contends that he has properly joined the members of the ZHBA.8 Id. at 27-29. Finally, he urges that we grant him an injunction because remand to the ZHBA would be futile. Id. at 38.9
In reply, the ZHBA defendants point out that DePolo raises factual allegations not pled in the complaint10 and misstates
[105 F.Supp.3d 492]
The Board asserts cognate reasons to dismiss DePolo's suit.
First, it contends that the FCC's regulation does not preempt the
Commonwealth's zoning laws and, as a result, DePolo fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. Board MTD at 7. It argues that it is well
recognized the FCC may preempt state action in three ways: (1) by express
language in a Congressional enactment, (2) by implication when a Congressional
scheme occupies the legislative field, or (3) by implication because of a
conflict with a Congressional enactment. Id. at 8; see also Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
[S]o long as a municipality makes reasonable accommodations for the construction of an antenna, it does not violate PRB-1. Here, because [the Board defendants] have attempted to accommodate [DePolo's] request, there is no basis upon which the ordinance in question can be said to be preempted by or violate PRB-1.
Id. at 17. Observing that DePolo was offered a variance to build a 65-foot tower, which he declined, the Board argues that his "refusal to participate ... does not create a federal claim." Id. at 18.
It also argues that DePolo's state law claims should be dismissed because he has not suffered injury (as the Township granted him a variance for a 65-foot tower) and he therefore lacks standing to pursue a claim under Section 302 of the Pennsylvania General Local Government Code. Id. at 19. And the Board urges us to exercise our discretion to abstain from hearing this matter under Pullman — arguing nonetheless that DePolo's federal and state preemption claims lack merit — because it maintains that DePolo raises "state law issues subject to state law interpretation that could obviate the need to adjudicate his constitutional claim." Id. at 22, 23. Specifically, no Pennsylvania Court has yet interpreted Section 302. Id. at 23. Determining how that law balances amateur radio operators' tower regulation with preservation of Pennsylvania's natural and historic spaces is, the Board argues, "an important state policy that should be left to the state courts to resolve in the first instance."11 Id. at 25.
Responding in opposition, DePolo argues that our Court of Appeals held in Izzo
v. Borough of River Edge,
[105 F.Supp.3d 493]
We begin our inquiry with DePolo's federal preemption claim that seeks relief through a declaratory judgment.
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides that:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.... Further necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202. As the Supreme Court noted in Wilton v. Seven
Falls Co.,
We have subject matter jurisdiction under our Court of Appeals's teaching in
Izzo. There, an amateur radio operator sought injunctive relief,
declaratory judgment, and damages in the district court after a local zoning
board denied him a variance to extend the height of his transmission tower. 843
F.2d at 766. The court, concerned about its jurisdiction, construed Burford
v. Sun Oil Co.,
[105 F.Supp.3d 494]
We turn now to PRB-1, the FCC ruling on which DePolo hangs his preemption argument. In PRB-1, a declaratory ruling made at the American Radio Relay League's behest, the FCC recognized the strong federal interest in promoting amateur radio operators, particularly for emergency communication. PRB-1, 101 F.C.C.2d at 959. "Upon weighing these interests, we believe a limited preemption policy is warranted. State and local regulations that operate to preclude amateur communications in their communities are in direct conflict with federal objectives and must be preempted." Id. at 960. At the same time, the agency refused to entirely preempt the field by specifying height limitations or local mechanisms to apply for variances or conditional use permits. Id. Instead, the agency concluded that local ordinances involving "placement, screening, or height of antennas based on health, safety, or aesthetic considerations must ... accommodate reasonably" amateur radio communications and "represent the minimum practicable regulation" for accomplishing the local purpose. Id.
"The cornerstone on which we will predicate our decision is that a reasonable accommodation may be made between the two sides." Id. at 959.
Our Court of Appeals has not construed PRB-1's limited preemption. Federal
courts that have considered PRB-1's preemptive effect have upheld it in two
circumstances. See Pentel, 13 F.3d at 1263 (citing cases). A local
ordinance that bans or imposes fixed height restrictions on amateur radio
antennas runs afoul of PRB-1 and the federal regulation therefore facially
preempts such local regulation. See, e.g., Evans, 994 F.2d at 762; see
also Bodony v. Inc. Village of Sands Point,
[105 F.Supp.3d 495]
Regrettably, the FCC offers little guidance about "reasonable accommodation" in the context of local zoning ordinances.
[W]e recognize that a local community that wants to preserve residential areas as livable neighborhoods may adopt zoning regulations that forbid the construction and installation in a residential neighborhood of the type of antenna that is commonly and universally associated with those that one finds in a factory area or an industrialized complex. Although such a regulation could constrain amateur communications, we do not view it as failing to provide reasonable accommodation to amateur communications.
Second Modification, 15 F.C.C.R. at 22154.
As noted, which "reasonable accommodation" shields a municipality from coverage of the FCC's limited preemption has not to date come before our Court of Appeals. But we find the reasoning of other Courts of Appeals persuasive as to the steps a municipality must take with minimum practicable regulation to reasonably accommodate an amateur radio operator. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits adopted a three-part prong approach under which "a city [is] free to deny an antenna permit as long as it has considered the application, made factual findings, and attempted to negotiate a satisfactory compromise with the applicant." Howard, 937 F.2d at 1380 (cited with approval in Pentel, 13 F.3d at 1264). The Tenth Circuit in Evans similarly cited as signs of a municipality's reasonable accommodation the three hearings at which evidence was taken from the ham operator, his neighbors and experts in ham radio operation and real estate, as well as the number of alternative antennas and sites considered. Evans, 994 F.2d at 762.
The Eight Circuit flat-footedly held that "[a]pplication of this
reasonable accommodation standard ... does not require the city to allow the
amateur to erect any antenna [he] desires." Pentel, 13 F.3d at
1264. We find this teaching — rooted in common sense — persuasive. Indeed, a district
court found a municipal planning commission reasonably accommodated an
applicant by "carefully considering the relevant law, offering compromise
solutions, ordering an independent assessment of the application, and making
detailed findings of its reasons for denying the application." Bosscher
v. Township of Algoma,
By contrast, a planning board demonstrates its inflexibility by making
unreasonable demands — for example, restricting the applicant's tower operation
to nighttime or requiring him to spend thousands of dollars on vegetative
screening (after the applicant accommodated previous requests for site
proposals and liability insurance, and on his own initiative agreed to lower
the tower when not in use). See Palmer v. City of Saratoga Springs,
[105 F.Supp.3d 496]
Turning to the facts DePolo alleges, there is no question that the Township of Tredyffrin took steps to reasonably accommodate him. To begin with, the Township demonstrated that the Township's building height ordinance is not rigidly inflexible since the ZHBA exercised its authority to grant DePolo a permit for a 65-foot tower. We agree with the defendants that the ordinance is not, accordingly, facially preempted.
What's more, the ZHBA considered DePolo's application during the course of hearings held on five days over three months at which it took testimony from the applicant, neighbors and a neighborhood association, as well as interested parties such as the National Park Service and experts who were able to discuss the communications range of differently configured antennas. It made factual findings about DePolo's proposed tower in comparison with other industrial structures in the neighborhood — both as to its physical presence and broadcast reach — and it reviewed over one hundred exhibits admitted into evidence. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the ZHBA offered DePolo a 65-foot tower permit as a compromise.
As to whether the parties engaged in negotiations, DePolo contends that the Township did not offer to negotiate with him (and, he suggests, actively opposed him) and that he requires a 180-foot tower, not a 65-foot one which he claims is a "completely ineffective antenna height." Compl. at ¶ 27. The Township is silent as to any efforts to negotiate. The ZHBA takes pains to point us to Pennsylvania statutes which block a zoning hearing board from initiating or participating in mediation. See Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Act of 1968, P.L. 805, No. 247 as reenacted and amended, Art. IX, Zoning Hearing Board and other Administrative Proceedings, Section 908.1.
Whether the ZHBA offer of a permit for a 65-foot tower shows enough spirit of compromise is not a question we need answer because the FCC's requirement for reasonable accommodation requires both sides to strive for accord. PRB-1 does not oblige any Township to give DePolo the tower height he chooses. Indeed, its focus on the federal interest in radio communications appears amply met here on the face of the ZHBA's factual findings, by DePolo's existing antenna and the offer of a permit for a 65-foot tower. DePolo, by his own admission, took no steps to meet the Township part way. Instead, he inflexibly demanded a permit for a 180-foot tower. And his subsequent decision to withdraw his permit application short-circuited the process. We find that the Township's proposed permit for a 65-foot tower sought to reasonably accommodate DePolo and his decision to insist on his way or the highway does not satisfy the FCC's accommodative approach. To find otherwise would encourage disappointed or disaffected applicants to try to end-run established process and sabotage negotiations they deem unfavorable by seeking redress in federal court.
We will not, therefore, declare that PRB-1 preempts Tredyffrin's zoning ordinance or the ZHBA's October 23, 2014 decision. We will grant the defendants' motions and dismiss DePolo's complaint, concluding that he cannot invoke the FCC's limited preemption doctrine when
[105 F.Supp.3d 497]
Nonetheless, we again take further guidance from the Eighth Circuit and "exhort the parties to work together to arrive at a satisfactory solution." Pentel, 13 F.3d at 1266.
For the reasons detailed above, we dismiss DePolo's federal claims. We also decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims. As we are dismissing this matter, we deny as moot the would-be interveners' motion for reconsideration.
An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 18th day of May, 2015, upon consideration of the motions to dismiss filed by the Board of Supervisors of Tredyffrin Township and its members ("Board") (docket entry #22) and the Zoning Hearing Board of Appeals and its members ("ZHBA") (docket entry #2), and the plaintiff's opposition thereto, as well as the ZHBA's motion for leave to file a reply (docket no. 24) and the would-be interveners' motion for reconsideration (docket entry #38), it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The ZHBA's motion for leave to file a reply is GRANTED;
2. The ZHBA's motion to dismiss is GRANTED;
3. The Board's motion to dismiss is GRANTED;
4. The would-be interveners' motion for reconsideration is DENIED AS MOOT;
5. The Court having determined under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) that it declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction under plaintiff's state law claims, the plaintiff's case is DISMISSED; and
6. The Clerk of Court shall CLOSE this action statistically.
1. With additional antenna, the proposed tower's height would be about 190 feet. Cmplt., Ex A at 11.
2. The plaintiff filed the zoning permit application with his wife but he is the sole plaintiff in this action as she is not a licensed radio operator. See Pl. Resp. to ZHBA MTD at note 1.
3. Quoting Modification and Clarification of Policies and Procedures Governing Siting and Maintenance of Amateur Radio Antennas and Support Structures, and Amendment of Section 97.15 of the Commission's Rules Governing the Amateur Radio Service, 14 F.C.C.R. 19413, 19416 (1999) (hereinafter "First Modification").
4. Quoting Modification and Clarification of Policies and Procedures Governing Siting and Maintenance of Amateur Radio Antennas and Support Structures, and Amendment of Section 97.15 of the Commission's Rules Governing the Amateur Radio Service, 15 F.C.C.R. 22151, 22154 (2000) (hereinafter "Second Modification").
5. 47 C.F.R. § 97.15(b) provides
6. As to DePolo's state claims, the ZHBA defendants argue we should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them because DePolo's federal preemption claim fails and he lacks standing to raise a state law preemption claim. Mem. of Law at 30-33. They also seek to strike a portion of the complaint as immaterial. Because we will dismiss on the basis of DePolo's federal preemption claim, we need not reach these marginal arguments.
7. "[W]hen the parties present other claims that are so
related to claims in the action that they form part of the same case or
controversy, a federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.
Additionally, when matters incident to the disposition of the primary matter
arise before a court, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction permits district
courts to decide them." Bryan v. Erie Cnty. Office of Children
and Youth,
8. DePolo also argues that the ZHBA defendants wrongly claim that the Township classified his residential district such that his property is exempt from 53 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 302, the Pennsylvania statute governing municipalities' regulation of antenna height. Resp. to ZHBA MTD at 32-37.
9. In his response in opposition DePolo quotes liberally from PRB-1, First and Second Modifications, but fails to cite appropriately to those documents.
10. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we must look
"only to the facts alleged in the complaint and its attachments without
reference to other parts of the record." Jordan v. Fox,
Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel,
11. The Board defendants also contend that DePolo duplicatively sued the individual Board members and erroneously failed to join indispensable parties including Valley Forge and the association of 800 homeowners. Board MTD at 25-28.
12. DePolo argues that he has properly joined the Board members in their official capacities and joined all necessary parties. Resp. to Board MTD at 35-38.
13. As stated above, our federalist system recognizes a
finite number of preemption doctrines. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n,